Traditional economic analysis of markets with asymmetric information assumes that the uninformed agents account for the incentives of the informed agents to distort information. We analyze whether investors in the stock market internalize such incentives in practice. Security analysts provide investors with information about investment opportunities by issuing buy and sell recommendations. These recommendations are likely to be biased upwards, particularly if the issuing analyst is affiliated with an investment bank that is a recent underwriter of the recommended firm. Using the trading data from the New York Stock Exchange Trades and Quotations database (TAQ), we find that large (institutional) investors generate abnormal volumes of buyer-initiated trades after a positive recommendation only if the analyst is unaffiliated. Small (individual) traders exert abnormal buy pressure after all positive recommendations, whether the analyst is affiliated or unaffiliated. Large traders also exert significant selling pressure in response to hold recommendations, and no pressure in response to buy recommendations while small traders exert zero pressure for hold recommendations and significantly positive pressure for buys. The trading behavior of small investors induces losses relative to large investor trading behavior, since stocks recommended by affiliated analysts perform significantly worse than those recommended by unaffiliated analysts. Our results imply that larger investors account for the incentives of analysts to distort information, but small investors do not. Increased coverage of a stock does not reduce the informational distortion of affiliated analysts. * We would like to thank
I. Introduction
Traditional economic analysis of markets with asymmetric information builds on the assumption that uninformed agents account for the incentives of informed agents to distort information. In the lemons model (Akerlof 1970) , the uninformed agent understands that the informed agent does not have an incentive to reveal negative features of the commodity and that he would rather advertise the lemon as a "hidden gem." Consequently, the uninformed agent does not rely on such unverifiable information, and the informed agent abstains from providing it in the first place. To put it in the context of cheap talk games, if all Sender-types have the same preferences over the Receiver's action, e.g. that they buy the good, cheap talk cannot be informative (Crawford and Sobel 1982) .
This result changes dramatically if the uninformed agent is naïve about the information provided. If uninformed agents were to take cheap talk at face value, the informed agents would want to provide biased information and would make profits from subsequent economic interaction.
What happens in real markets? Are agents sophisticated enough to understand the informed agents' incentives to distort information? Or do they naively trust the informed agents?
In this paper, we analyze naïveté about incentives to distort information in the market for stocks and stock recommendations. Analysts of brokerage firms are more informed about the value of a stock and provide investors with information in the form of buy/hold/sell recommendations. They have, however, incentives to distort this information upward, e.g. in order to generate trading commissions from buy orders. The incentives to bias recommendations upward are even stronger if the analyst is affiliated, i.e. if the analyst's brokerage belongs to an investment bank whose corporate finance department is underwriting security issuances of the firms covered by the analyst. Positive analyst coverage after an equity issuance is often viewed as part of an implicit agreement between underwriter and issuer.
1 Moreover, analysts have financial incentives to cover those stocks favorably since their compensation depends, either directly or indirectly, on their "support" in generating profits for the corporate finance department.
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If investors were rational, they should account for such informational distortions of analyst recommendations. First, they should discount positive and neutral recommendations on 1 Michaely and Womack (1999) . 2 Michaely and Womack (2003) ; Hong and Kubik (2003) .
average, i.e. exert less buy pressure than they would in response to undistorted recommendations.
Second, they should react less to recommendations from analysts who are affiliated with the underwriter of an issuer. In turn, brokerage firms would specialize in recommendations about firms with which they are not in an underwriting relationship. If, however, investors are naïve and do not discount enough for analysts' incentives, they might overreact to positive recommendations and not account for affiliation. In this case, having analysts and corporate finance divisions united under one roof becomes a profitable business.
In this paper, we examine empirically whether investors account for analysts' incentives in their trading decision. As in previous behavioral literature on the role of biases in markets, we suggest that individual agents may be subject to biases, while firms and their associated professionals -due to specialization, experience, and competitive pressure -display fully rational behavior. 3 This distinction separates professional analysts from amateur investors, but more importantly, it splits investors themselves into two groups. Accordingly, we will distinguish between small (individual) and large (institutional) investors, based on the trade size. Using trading data from the New York Stock Exchange Trades and Quotations (TAQ) database (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , we find distinctly different trade reactions to recommendations among large and among small investors. First, large investors react less positively than small investors to buy and hold recommendations. Large investors display less abnormal buy pressure in response to buy and strong buy recommendations than small investors. And, while small investors do not display any abnormal trading behavior in response to hold recommendations, large investors sell. Second, large investors distinguish between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts and exert buy pressure only after positive recommendations of unaffiliated analysts. Small traders also react positively to buy and strong-buy recommendations of unaffiliated analysts -but they are equally enthusiastic about stocks recommended by affiliated analysts. We find a significant difference between the large trader correction and the small trader correction for affiliation.
We show that such trading behavior hurts small investors. Taking recommendations literally -rather than adjusting them downward -induces losses. Replicating results from previous literature, we also show that following the recommendations of affiliated analysts generates significantly lower returns than following unaffiliated analysts' advice. Over any investment horizon between 3 months and 5 years, the unaffiliated portfolio outperforms the affiliated portfolio.
The results suggest that large investors act according to rational economic theory and account for the incentives of analysts but small investors do not. Two empirical results suggest that informational constraints do not suffice to explain the behavior of small investors. First, if investors were fully rational but lacking information about analyst affiliation, their average reaction to positive recommendations should still take the upward bias among all analysts into account. We find, however, that small investors react more positively to recommendations than large investors. In particular, while large investors sell in response to hold recommendations, small investors do not. Second, to the extent that it is more costly for small investors to find out about analysts' affiliation, small investors can benefit from focusing on analysts who are "visibly" unaffiliated, for instance because their brokerage does not have any associated corporate finance department. We find that, in fact, recommendations of "never-affiliated" analysts have the least upward bias, but small investors do not display abnormal trade reaction in response to their recommendation.
We thus interpret our results as evidence that small investors fail to adjust for the incentive conflicts on the part of analysts and fail to discount the investment advice sufficiently.
Their biased decision-making has negative welfare consequences, as demonstrated by the negative returns to a portfolio of affiliated recommendations. Further empirical analysis indicates that the competitive forces of market interaction do not remedy the bias in individual decisionmaking. Quite to the contrary, we show that recommendations about stocks that are covered by more analysts are more likely to be distorted upwards, not less.
The findings of this paper relate to other market settings in which the more informed agent gives advice to the less informed agent even though the two agents have conflicting interests. For example, firms provide consumers with product information in advertisements, but will not present any negative features. Consumers who take all advertisements at face value are likely to over-consume or to misallocate their resources. Similarly, salesmen can judge which product is most suitable for their clients, but will also be inclined to recommend the product that maximizes their commission. Our findings suggest that individuals do not always account sufficiently for the misalignment in incentives, but follow distorted advice too closely. A
competitive market setting appears to be insufficient to endogenously trigger the rise of institutions that cater to the interest of the individual consumer. Other literature in finance interprets investor reaction to firms' accounting choices, issuance decisions, and repurchase offers as "credulity:" When interpreting signals from the informed party, the firm, investors do not discount enough for the incentives of others to manipulate the signal.
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In most settings different psychological explanations of the naiveté about incentives are possible. Investors may take the distorted information at face value due to limited attention. Or, they may be genuinely "too trusting." Our analysis allows some distinction. Since small investors are strongly reacting to the recommendations themselves, they should also realize the extremely low portion of sell recommendations (about 5%) and be induced to consider distortions. Mere inattention is unlikely to explain our results.
This paper relates to two main branches of literature in finance and behavioral economics. In behavioral economics, the questions of whether biases in individual decisionmaking persist in market settings, and how biases may affect the industrial organization in these markets are of increasing interest. A number of papers show that market interaction does not eliminate biases but may rather exacerbate their effect since firms tailor their contracts and products to take advantage of them (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2003; Gabaix and Laibson, 2003) . The specific bias, naiveté about incentives and about the resulting distortion of information, may be related to the experimental finding that subjects embrace the advice of other subjects, even if the advice-givers do not have superior information (Schotter, 2003) .
In the finance literature, this paper builds upon the evidence in and Michaely and Womack (1999) that stock recommendations by affiliated analysts are more favorable but perform more poorly over short (3-day) and long (up to 2-year) horizons. Iskoz (2002) confirms these results for strong buy recommendations and provides evidence that institutional investors may be accounting for the distortions of affiliated analysts, as far as one can deduce from the quarterly changes in institutional ownership. Finally, our paper relates to the market microstructure literature on trading reactions. We employ the modified Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to classify trades as buyer-or seller-initiated (following Odders-White 2000)
and measure trade reaction as in Lee (1992) , Hvidkjaer (2001) , and Shanthikumar (2003) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research design and empirical strategy. Section 3 provides details on the various sources of data employed in this study. In Section 4, we present the empirical results on distortions in analyst recommendations, on the trade reaction of small and large investors, and on the associated returns. We also discuss alternative explanations for the trading behavior of small investors.
Section 5 explores, in more details, how firms incorporate the biases in individual trade decisions, and points to the effects of competition among analysts (as captured by coverage). Section 6 concludes.
II. Empirical Strategy

II. 1 Analyst Incentives
Sell-side analysts issue recommendations about the specific set of stocks they are covering. Recommendations typically range from "strong sell" to "strong buy." These recommendations are published in various forms such as analyst reports, references to these reports in online data sources, 5 radio and TV interviews on CNBC and other channels, and news articles.
Sell-side analysts face a well-known conflict of interest when providing investment advice in the form of recommendations. On the one hand, it is their job to provide profound security analyses and reliable recommendations to customers. Customers will, in turn, invest in the recommended stocks via the associated brokerage firm. The brokerage firm earns trading commissions and additional fees for their recommendations and reports. Good recommendations enhance the reputation of an analyst and thus lead to higher compensation.
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On the other hand, analysts have incentives to bias their recommendations upwards. One reason is simply that buy recommendations are more likely to generate trading business than sell recommendations. A buy recommendation can induce any investor to buy a stock; a sell recommendation, however, is mostly relevant for current owners of the stocks, given the shortselling constraints investors face. In addition, analysts are exposed to pressure from the management of the company they are covering. In order to ensure increases in shareholder value of their company, management tends to "freeze out" analysts who do not give positive recommendations and to not provide them with information. 7 Similarly, buy-side clients may push sell-side analysts to maintain positive recommendations on stocks they hold. Hong et al. (2000) . 7 Boni and Womack (2002) cite several press reports and the testimony of the (then) acting SEC chairman Laura Unger to the Hous Subcommittee on July 31, 2001.
8 Boni and Womack (2002) .
business. Favorable recommendations are generally viewed as a precondition for investment banks to get future underwriting deals and as an implicit condition of existing underwriting contracts. Analysts whose brokerage firm is associated with an investment bank are likely to be exposed to pressure (and monetary incentives) from corporate finance departments to support underwriting business with positive recommendations.
As a result, analysts are trading off their reputational capital with the incentive to generate portfolio transactions and, in the case of affiliation with an investment bank, the incentive to generate underwriting business.
II. 2 Investor Rationality
The effect of these incentive distortions on analyst behavior depends on investor rationality. If investors accounted rationally for the incentives of analysts, they would discount positive analyst recommendations in general and those of analysts affiliated with an underwriting investment bank in particular. This implies that rational investors may want to sell in response to hold recommendations and may not want to buy in response to buy recommendations. Moreover, their buy reaction should be stronger in response to positive recommendations of unaffiliated analysts than to those of affiliated analysts. Such trading behavior might, in turn, induce analysts not issue recommendations about companies for which their investment bank is underwriting security issuances, given the negative effect of biased recommendations on analyst reputation.
If, however, investors are naïve about the effect of incentives, then issuing biased recommendations becomes a profitable business. Naïve agents do not account for the general upward bias and react too strongly to recommendations on average, and naïve agents do not account for the additional incentive distortion of affiliated analysts and display the same reaction to affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations.
In this paper, we consider separately the trading behavior of large (institutional) Individuals who decide to work in the finance industry and are successful enough to find such a job in a large institution have a better financial education and better skills in financial decisionmaking than the average individual investor. This reasoning is supported by findings in the previous literature, such as the anomalous trade reaction of small traders to earnings news (Lee 1992 ).
II.3 Empirical measures
We separate small and large investors by trading size. Following the analysis of Lee and Radhakrishna (2000), we choose dollar cutoffs rather than share-based cutoffs in order to minimize noise in separating individuals from institutions. We also incorporate their suggestion to use two cutoffs, with a buffer zone between small and large trades. Specifically we choose the cutoffs based on results for three-month TORQ sample from 1990-91, in which actual information on the identity of traders was available to check the accuracy of the trade-size based classification method. The lower cutoff of $20,000 splits small and medium trades, and the higher cutoff of $50,000 splits medium and large trades.
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Our empirical measures of analyst affiliation are based on the underwriting relationship of the analyst's brokerage house with the firm the analyst is reporting on. As in the previous literature 11 , we first identify analysts as affiliated if the corporate finance division of their investment bank was the lead underwriter of an IPO of the recommended firm in the past five years or of an SEO in the past two years. We also include co-underwriters over the same respective periods.
We further examine two additional possible sources of underwriting bias. First, we look at future underwriting, i.e. analysts firms that underwrite an SEO in the next one or two years.
Future underwriting may be a source of bias since the investment bank may want to please the firm it is recommending in order to gain underwriting business. 
II. 4 Trade Reaction
To capture the reaction of small and large investors to analyst recommendations, we employ measures of "directional trade" or trade initiation. These measures, first developed by Lee and Ready (1991) , aim at capturing the buy pressure exerted by traders. They exploit the fact that most trades take place when one side of the transaction demands immediate execution. The total trade volume is analyzed trade-by-trade and decomposed into "buyer-initiated" and "sellerinitiated" trades, depending on which side demanded immediate execution. An abnormally high balance of buyer-initiated trades indicates buy pressure; an abnormally high balance of sellerinitiated trades indicates sell pressure.
We use the modified version of the Lee and Ready (1991) 12 The original Lee-Ready algorithm employs a "zero-tick" in the case that a trade is at the bid-ask midpoint and the same price as the previous trade. Because of its low accuracy (about 60% according to Odders-White, 2000 ) the "zero-tick" is left out in the modified Lee-Ready algorithm. 
The adjustments are made by year because the average trading behavior changes significantly over time, and by firm because the trading behavior for various firms may have consistent differences. This allows us to aggregate across firms without concerns for differences in the non-event-time trading behavior associated with them. Normalizing the measures by the standard deviation allows us to make qualitative comparisons between small and large investors.
Moreover, without the normalization, a seemingly more extreme reaction could be the result of higher volatility in trade imbalances over time. Dividing by the standard deviation controls for systematic differences in the volatility of large trades and small trades or in the volatility of the stocks large and small traders invest in. 
III. Data
We analyze three main sources of data: data on securities trading, data on analyst recommendations, and data on underwriting.
The raw trading data is collected from the New York Stock Exchange Trades and Quotations database (TAQ). The TAQ database reports every round-lot trade and every quote from January 1, 1993 onwards on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. We examine ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, excluding certificates and depository receipts. We also exclude foreign companies, Americus trust components, closed-end fund shares and REITs. The final trading sample includes 2801 securities for 2723 firms, as defined by 8-digit and 6-digit CUSIPs, respectively.
We obtain analyst recommendations and information about the analyst and brokerage firm from I/B/E/S starting from October 29, 1993. I/B/E/S converts the recommendation formats of different brokerage houses into one uniform format (from 1 for "strong buy" to 5 for "strong sell"). Like other authors (Jagadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee, 2002) , we reverse the original I/B/E/S coding to the following scheme: 5=strong buy, 4=buy, 3=hold, 2=sell, 1=strong sell to make the ordering more intuitive. A "higher" recommendation is better and an "upgrade"
translates into a positive change in the numerical value.
We use the SDC New Issues database to obtain underwriting data from 1987 to 2002. We link I/B/E/S broker firms and SDC underwriters with the company names provided by the I/B/E/S recommendation broker identification file and the SDC database. We improve the match using company websites and news articles, in particular to determine subsidiary relationships and corporate name changes. Finally, we used the mapping from Kolasinski and Kothari (2003) to identify additional matches.
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In addition, we use CRSP for security prices, returns, and share information, and Notice that only 12% of the firms in our NYSE sample lack recommendations, so that our final sample contains almost the entire set of domestic NYSE firms with common stock.
There are an unusually high number of recommendations made during the first three months of the sample period, although this may be due to differences in the way I/B/E/S dealt with data at the beginning of the sample period. While the number of recommendations per year 
IV. Empirical Analysis
IV.1. Analyst Recommendations
We first analyze the distribution of recommendations (from "strong sell" to "strong buy") among affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. As Table II shows, analysts make very few strong sell and sell recommendations, regardless of their affiliation. If investors were to take the titles given to analyst recommendations literally, they would constantly be purchasing securities. The strikingly skewed distribution is consistent with analysts' incentive to issue buy recommendations rather than sell recommendations simply from the amount of trading business this will generate.
Table II also displays the distribution of recommendations for each type of underwriting affiliation with the recommended firms. "IPO lead underwriting" affiliation means that the analyst's investment bank was the lead underwriter of an IPO in the past 5 years. Similarly if the investment bank underwrote an SEO in the past 2 years, the analyst is "SEO lead underwriting"
affiliated. "Co-underwriting" affiliation is defined for the same period. All three of these groups have average recommendations of 4.00 or higher -their average recommendation is at least a "buy." Unaffiliated analysts, on the other hand, have average recommendations of 3.76.
In addition to the previous equity underwriting affiliations, we analyze two types of underwriting affiliations that have not been explored in the previous literature. The first type of affiliation is due to future equity underwriting. An analyst whose firm is planning on underwriting an equity offering may be pressured to issue higher recommendations, in order to please the issuer and to receive a better price on the equity offering. Alternatively, the very reason the investment bank chooses to underwrite may be that they view the company very favorably, resulting in unconscious rather than conscious "distortion." Another potential source of conflict that has not been examined is bond underwriting, and we include this affiliation as well.
Including all affiliation categories, there are a total of 11,017 affiliated recommendations, We also consider separately "independent" brokerage firms -firms that never underwrite securities during our SDC sample period of 1987 through 2002. Non-underwriting firm analysts make the most strong-sell and sell recommendations of any group we look at, and their average recommendation is significantly lower than the average recommendation of unaffiliated brokerage firms in general or any other group.
We consider the possibility that positive recommendations made by affiliated analysts are caused by differences in the firms being covered. Companies that have recently issued securities may be truly of higher quality, as evidenced by their ability to access the capital markets. We thus restrict our sample to recommendations on firms that have recently issued stock or bonds. Panel B
of Table II shows that we obtain similar statistics. The higher recommendations are not due to characteristics of the firms that have issued new securities, but are due to the affiliated analysts.
Further evidence that the differences do not arise from differences in the firms being covered is presented in Table III . A detailed look at the NAIC industries covered by each group shows that there are no significant differences.
The timing of the different types of recommendations helps to further pin down "distortions" in the recommendations of affiliated analysts. It would have been conceivable that part of the upward bias is due to quicker reactions of affiliated analysts. They may issue a "strong buy" as soon as they receive indications of future growth prospects, even if they have to revise it soon after. Results shown in Table IV suggest that affiliated analysts do the opposite. They simply preserve positive recommendations longer than unaffiliated analysts, and update negative recommendations more quickly. Affiliated analysts maintain strong sell and sell recommendations for an average of about 3 months, while unaffiliated analysts maintain these negative recommendations for almost twice as long, about 6 months. Affiliated analysts also update hold recommendations more quickly than unaffiliated analysts. However, affiliated analysts do not update their buy and strong buy results as often. Rather, they maintain their positive recommendations for a month longer than the unaffiliated analysts. As shown in the upgrade/downgrade sample statistics in Table IV , affiliated analysts wait about two and a half months longer than unaffiliated analysts before downgrading a stock. The differences in timing are significant (regression analysis in Panel B).
A related question is how the recommendations of affiliated analysts compare to the existing analyst consensus. Panel B shows that, moreover, affiliated analysts do not deviate much from the current consensus.
Instead, they issue their positive recommendations when the consensus is high -in fact, when the consensus is higher than the level at which unaffiliated analysts issue positive recommendations.
For example, most analysts tend to issue buy recommendations when the consensus is below buy.
In contrast, IPO lead underwriting affiliated analysts, and IPO and SEO co-underwriting affiliated analysts, issue buy recommendations when the consensus is above buy.
This behavior makes it hard for investors to identify "blatant" distortions. If an analyst were to issue a strong buy recommendation when the consensus is low, the recommendation would stand out. Instead, the affiliated analysts appear to exploit their opportunity when the consensus is high enough to justify positive recommendations. As we saw earlier, the affiliated analysts then maintain these positive recommendations much longer than unaffiliated analysts. 
IV. 2. Returns
Previous literature has shown that stocks recommended by affiliated analysts perform significantly worse than those recommended by unaffiliated analysts (Michaely and Womack 1999; Iskoz 2002) . These results appear to hold under various measures of abnormal returns, such as the market-model abnormal buy-hold returns and portfolio returns in the Fama-French three-and four-factor model.
Before we turn to the core of our empirical analysis, we briefly replicate those results on our sample and evaluate the returns from trading based on the analyst recommendations.
Describing our primary portfolio method, we construct two different portfolios. In one, the recommendations of all affiliated analysts are followed -stock is purchased for a buy or strongbuy recommendation, and sold for a sell or strong-sell recommendation. In the second portfolio, the same is done, but following only unaffiliated analysts. We then examine both the buy-andhold returns and the cumulative abnormal returns of these portfolios over many different time horizons. The investment strategy of a naïve (small) investor is likely to correspond to some convex combination of the two portfolios. Rational (large) investors will instead put zero weight on the first portfolio.
We estimate abnormal returns using the market model. We form event-time portfolios based on recommendations and estimate the relation of event-time portfolio and market portfolio over the one-year period ending two months before the event as follows:
where R i,t is the return on portfolio i on day t,
R m,t is the return on the market portfolio on day t.
We then use the estimated values of α and β to calculate the abnormal return during and after the event period. The abnormal return is the difference between the realized portfolio return and the predicted return based on the estimated parameters and the realized market returns.
We evaluate buy-and-hold returns over a number of horizons. Since the analyst issuing a recommendation is likely to be evaluated during the same year, the performance over the next six months to one year might be most relevant. On the other hand, small investors may not reevaluate the position for years to come. Thus, longer horizons are also of interest from the perspective of the investors.
We repeat the same portfolio calculations considering only buy-and strong buy recommendations. These two portfolios are essentially the same as the above without shortselling. As additional robustness checks, we also calculate the returns using four other portfolio methods, such as shorting strong sell, sell and hold recommendations and buying for buy and strong buy recommendations. All portfolio methods also yield market-model-adjusted returns which are higher for the unaffiliated portfolio than for the affiliated portfolio.
Table VI presents the results for our two primary portfolio methods. Regardless of the particular time horizon and portfolio composition, we find that following affiliated recommendations leads to lower (more negative) returns than following unaffiliated analysts.
Table VI presents the specific return results over 3 months, 6 months, the first, second and third years, and the fourth and fifth years together. During each of these periods, and many others, the affiliated portfolio earns significantly lower returns than the unaffiliated portfolio. The differences are economically significant as well, on the order of 13-15% a year.
14 We also make sure that these results are not driven by long-run underperformance of IPOs and SEOs by calculating the same returns, limiting the sample to IPO-and SEO-firms only. These results reinforce the result that following affiliated recommendations leads to underperformance. A second method to ensure that the results are not driven by the long-run underperformance of IPOs and SEOs is to create a benchmark portfolio of firms that undergo equity offerings. Table VI shows that the raw returns of both of the affiliated portfolios perform worse than the benchmark.
This suggests that an investor, wanting to trade securities of recent equity issuers, would do better 14 Note that this difference is virtually identical to the numbers in Michaely and Womack (1999) .
simply buying indiscriminately than he would following the affiliated recommendations, despite the additional information we might expect an affiliated analyst to have. The unaffiliated portfolio raw returns seem slightly lower than the benchmark during the first year using one portfolio method but not another. Because the unaffiliated portfolio covers stocks with different risk characteristics than the benchmark or affiliated portfolio, this result does not reflect strongly on whether unaffiliated recommendations provide information in general.
We also break recommendations down by whether they are upgrades or downgrades. We find that the general relationship continues to hold -following affiliated recommendations leads to lower returns than following unaffiliated recommendations. The difference appears stronger for upgrade recommendations, although it is both statistically and economically significant for both groups.
Notice that we find negative abnormal returns to both affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations. This result is of course due to the simple portfolio formation. As Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2001) have shown more sophisticated strategies allow to "profit from the prophets", at least if short selling the least-recommended stocks.
In addition to the event-study methodology, we evaluated returns using a calendar-time approach. We estimated daily abnormal portfolio returns using a Fama-French three-factor model. We find a negative alpha both for the portfolio of affiliated recommendations and the portfolio of unaffiliated recommendations. While the affiliated portfolio still has a lower alpha, the difference is not significant. The key difference between the two portfolio returns is the weighting on the HML portfolio, suggesting that a large part of the difference in returns we observe using other methods is driven by a difference in the book-to-market characteristics of the firms affiliated and unaffiliated analysts recommend most highly.
IV.3. Trade Reaction
The incentives faced by analysts seem to have an effect on their recommendations.
Overall, analysts almost never recommend selling a stock. Underwriting-affiliated analysts issue even more positive recommendations than unaffiliated analysts, and consistently issue more buy and strong buy recommendations than unaffiliated analysts. The primary question of this section is the following: Do investors account for these distortions in their trading decisions? In order to answer this question, we look at buying and selling behavior of small and large traders
We apply different measures of trade imbalance to identify the buy or sell reaction triggered by recommendations. In particular, we use market microstructure algorithms to determine which side of a trade demanded more immediacy. In general, the side of a trade demanding faster execution represents a market order. Investors who have received positive information about a firm and who believe that the stock price would rise consistently, would not place a limit order to buy. (That limit order would never be filled.) Instead, he would place a market order, and demand to buy immediately -before the price goes up further. As we mentioned earlier (Section II.4), our trade imbalance measures reflect not only this "enthusiasm" about the stock, but they also relate empirically to corresponding changes in ownership.
Table VII presents summary statistics for our trading measures, both for the overall sample period and for the days of recommendations. While small investors execute more trades per day, the average differences between buy-and sell-initiated trades are very similar, 3.18 for small trades and 3.43 for large trades, over the entire sample period (Panel A). The median is 0 for both small and large trades.
To test the trader reactions to recommendations, we employ the methodology of event studies. Our primary event period is trading days 0 and 1 around the event, where day 0 is the first trading day on or after the recommendation. The summary statistics for trading behavior during these event days show that the difference between buys and sells is considerably higher, both for small and large trades on the days of recommendations (9.65 for small trades and 9.97 for large trades), indicating systematic buy-pressure induced by the recommendations. Table VIII shows the effects of different types of recommendations on trade in a regression framework. We employ the normalized measure of trade imbalance (as introduced in Section II). Going back to the two aspects of analyst distortions, we investigate both the investor reaction to analysts' general tendency issue only the positive recommendations and to the additional distortion of underwriting-affiliated analysts relative to their unaffiliated peers. Panel A shows that large investors' imbalance is positive for unaffiliated buy recommendations and significantly positive for strong buy recommendations and that it is negative for the same affiliated recommendations. The correction for affiliation is significant for both of these recommendations. Small traders, however, fail to adjust for affiliation, trading in almost exactly the same way for unaffiliated and affiliated positive recommendations. These results indicate that large traders account for the incentives of affiliated analysts to issue more positive recommendations. Small traders do not make this correction.
Moreover, the normalized measure allows comparisons not only across firms, but also across investor groups. Thus, the normalized trade imbalance results also suggest that small investors take analyst recommendations, in general, more literally than large traders, failing to correct for the first type of "bias" -the general upward shift in recommendations. Small traders react over twice as positively to strong buy recommendations as large traders. While large traders exhibit an insignificantly positive trade imbalance for a buy recommendation, small traders take the recommendation literally and trade significantly positively. Large traders induce sell pressure in response to a hold recommendation, while small traders again take the recommendation literally and exhibit an insignificantly positive, and nearly zero, trade imbalance. In all three cases, the difference between small and large trade behavior is significant. Small traders also react twice as strongly as large traders to sell and strong sell recommendations, judging by coefficient alone. But the difference in this reaction variable is not significant, probably due to the extremely low number of negative affiliated recommendations. This behavior indicates that small investors discount recommendations less on average, compared to large investors, and thus account less for potential distortions due to the incentive to generate trade. Table VIII presents the trading reactions to recommendations, depending on whether the given recommendation is an upgrade or downgrade. A downgrade, for example from strong buy to buy, is typically bad news, while an upgrade, e.g. from hold to buy, is good news. So even though the recommendation level is the same, we might expect slightly different reactions. We also saw, in Section IV.2 that the difference in returns from following unaffiliated versus affiliated recommendations is higher for upgrades. We find that small traders react more positively to a hold, buy or strong buy recommendation than large traders, whether that recommendation is an upgrade or downgrade.
Reaction to Upgrades and Downgrades. Panel B of
The difference is not significant for upgrade hold recommendations, but is highly significant for the other four categories. When we look only at recommendation level, disregarding whether the recommendation is an upgrade or downgrade, we find that small traders fail to account for underwriting affiliation, while large traders do adjust for affiliation. Panel B reveals that reactions to recommendation upgrades are driving this result. Large traders react more negatively when an affiliated analyst issues an upgrade hold, buy or strong buy, while small traders react more positively. The difference between the small and large trade corrections for affiliation is significant in each case. We also find that small investors account less for upgrade or downgrade.
For example, while large traders display a significantly negative reaction to downgrades from strong buy to buy and from buy to hold, small traders display positive or zero trade reaction.
Relationship Between Trading and Returns. Combining our results on trade reaction
and the earlier results on returns of portfolios formed according to affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations, we can infer that small traders lose money relative to large traders. In Table   IX , we provide more direct evidence of the loss induced by trading behavior that does not account for the distortions of analysts. We regress buy-and-hold returns over a three-months, a sixmonths, and a one-year horizon separately on the net value of small and large trades (on event days 0 and 1) and on a constant. For small investors, we find large and significantly negative returns over any horizon and at any positive amount of net trades. For large traders, instead, the coefficient on trade imbalance is minimal -about 0.4% to 0.5% of the coefficient for small trades (while the coefficient on the constant remains about the same) -and it is insignificant over the one-year horizon. In fact, for any net trade value up to about $7m for the one-year horizon and for up to $8.2 for the three-months horizon, large investors earn positive returns on their trades. (The average net trade size is $2.5m for large traders.) In addition to the raw return results displayed, we repeated the test using the various return and trade measures previously employed in this paper. We consistently find that there is a negative relationship between future returns and eventtime net trading, whether measured in dollars or number of trades.
IV.4. Robustness
Panel B of Table VIII re-estimates the standard errors, allowing for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-year correlation ("cluster by year") and arbitrary within-firm correlation ("cluster by brokerage"). Our results are robust to these alternative assumptions. Similarly, including year-or brokerage fixed effects in the regressions does not affect our results.
In addition, the results are similar if we employ the raw number of buy-initiated trades minus the number of sell-initiated trades over the event period. Also, longer horizons (up to 20 trading days after the recommendation) lead to similar results, indicating that small traders keep reacting to recommendations over some time period.
As an additional robustness check, we split "affiliation" into its component parts, including the additional definitions of possible affiliation, such as future underwriting and bond underwriting. We also include whether the firm has recently issued a security and whether the underwriter is independent. We repeat the regression for each year in the sample, and for various other sub-samples. With all of these variations, two general results remain. First, small traders fail to correct for underwriter affiliation to the extent that large traders correct for it. Second, small traders react more positively in general to hold, buy and strong buy recommendations than do large traders.
Firm size. To ensure that these results are not driven by brokerage firm size, we estimate additional regressions. We gather data on the annual sales and the number of employees for specific brokerage firms, from D&B's Million Dollar Database. We then match this data to our underwriting brokers, and use it to control for brokerage firm size. The results are slightly weaker for the subsample for which we gather this data, but as you can see from Table X, adding controls for size does not diminish the results any further. In fact, for both measures, including the controls improves the results for the sample for which the control is defined. The coefficients maintain the same signs and almost the same magnitudes as for the full sample, although the results are not significant with this subset.
Relationship Between Trading Size and Affiliation.
We analyze whether our empirical findings may be due to systematic changes in trading size in response to affiliation. In particular, it is conceivable that investors trade smaller amounts in response to affiliated buy recommendations than in response to unaffiliated buy recommendations. The resulting (re-)classification of large investors as small may generate the weaker trade reaction of large traders to affiliated recommendations. However, this is unlikely to be the case for two reasons. First, systematic shifts in trade size should be reflected in the measured large trades, so we check whether the size of trades above $50,000 varies with affiliation. We find that the trade size changes by less than 3.5%. The average large trade in response to an unaffiliated recommendation is $217,244. The average large trade in response to an affiliated recommendation is only $7,408 lower, at $209,836. It seems unlikely that for a significant portion of our sample trades of more than $50,000 in the first case are equivalent to trades of less than $20,000 in the second, and so any inaccuracies in our cutoffs are more likely to introduce noise than bias.
Second, it does not suffice for all traders to reduce their trade size to generate changes in trade imbalance. Rather, the relative portion of buy-initiators has to go down among traders classified as large. In other words, an abnormally high portion of those large investors who are particularly keen to buy the recommended stock has to reduce their trade size enough to drop out of the large-investor category and potentially join the small-investor category. This is not the case. Buy-initiated large trades change on average by 3.9% and sell-initiated large trades by 2.5%, i.e. both changes are small and similar.
Finally, and most importantly, variations in trade size cannot explain why small investors do not discount analyst recommendations on average, e.g. why they do not sell in response to sell recommendations.
IV.4. What drives the trading behavior of small investors?
We consider two main hypotheses to explain these behavioral differences. One hypothesis is that informational constraints explain the behavior of small investors. It is likely to be more costly for small investors than for large investors to identify analysts as affiliated. As a result small traders may decide to follow analyst recommendations regardless of affiliation, since the probability of randomly hitting an unaffiliated recommendation is high enough to compensate for the added risk of hitting an affiliated recommendation. Two empirical results suggest that informational constraints do not suffice to explain the behavior of small investors.
First, if investors were fully rational but lacking information about analyst affiliation, their average reaction to positive recommendations should still take the upward bias among all analysts into account. They may not be able to discriminate between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. But given that they display abnormal trade behavior upon analyst recommendations and given that 95% of these recommendations are positive or neutral, small investors should be aware of the general upward distortion and discount appropriately. We find, however, that small investors react more positively to recommendations than large investors. In particular, while large investors sell in response to hold recommendations, small investors do not.
Second, to the extent that it is more costly for small investors to find out about analysts' affiliation, small investors can benefit from focusing on analysts who are "visibly" unaffiliated, for instance because their brokerage does not have any associated corporate finance department.
Such information is easy to collect and, in fact, advertised by unaffiliated brokerage firms. We find that, in fact, recommendations of "never-affiliated" analysts have the least upward bias, but small investors do not display abnormal trade reaction in response to their recommendation.
Second, if costs of information prevented small investors to sort out affiliated recommendations, they should compensate for the informational constraint by paying more attention to analysts who never underwrite, i.e. whose brokerages simply do not have an affiliated corporate finance department or whose banks never do any underwriting. In fact, these firms tend to advertise their "independence" so that the information should be easily accessible. Even if information on specific underwriting relationships were hard to obtain, it would be easier for investors to get a general impression of which brokers underwrite heavily and which rarely underwrite. In this case, brokerage firms that never underwrite would certainly fall into the category of "brokerage firms that do not seem to underwrite very much," and small traders should react more strongly to them. However, trading behavior indicates that the opposite occurs. Of the 382 brokerage firms who issue recommendations for the firms in our sample, 105 (27%) do not have a single match to an SDC underwriter firm who was either the lead or co-underwriter on an equity issue for a US firm from 1987 on. These brokers issue about 5% of the recommendations in our sample. Small investors react significantly less to their buy and strong buy recommendations than to the average (affiliated or non-affiliated) recommendation, as shown in the first column of Table XI . This result is robust to controlling for brokerage firm size. In the fourth and fifth columns of Table XI , we display results after limiting the sample to the largest 50% of firms for which we have sales data, by sales and by number of employees. The results remain significant for strong buy recommendations, and the coefficients become even more negative for both buy and strong buy.
None of the results are consistent with the informational explanation.
V. Firm response
In a world with rational firms, biased consumer behavior not only affects the consumers' welfare, but the entire organization of the market. Firms have incentives to tailor their product design and information provision to take advantage of consumers' systematic deviations from optimal decision-making. In the case of stock market recommendations, it is profitable for investment banks to entertain a brokerage branch issuing distorted investment advice and, in particular, to unify brokerage and corporate finance under one roof since investors systematically neglect analyst distortions.
The firm response to consumer naiveté affects negatively the welfare of consumers. From a policy perspective, the question is how to optimally remedy this effect. One may ask whether there is hope for market forces to solve this problem under competition. Do analysts compete for clients by providing more accurate recommendations? Given that, almost always, the affiliated brokerages are covering the stock, increased competition implies an increased number of nonaffiliated analysts. Since unaffiliated analysts tend to bias their recommendations less, one may expect that competition also moderate the distortion in affiliated recommendations.
As a first attempt to address this question empirically, we analyze the relationship between the number of analysts covering a stock and the recommendation bias of affiliated analysts. For each recommendation, we calculate the number of analysts who had made a recommendation on the same stock in the past x months, for x = 1, 2, 6 and 12. Panel A of Table XII presents the summary statistics for the one-month coverage. We then relate the number of analysts covering the stock to the particular analyst's "deviation" from the average recommendation over the past months. Columns (1) and (3) of Panel B show that, as expected, affiliated recommendations tend to lie above the average recommendation. Increased coverage, however, does not mitigate the effect. As we can see from Columns (2) and (4), the opposite appears to be the case. Affiliated analysts tend to bias their recommendations more when more analysts are covering the stock. While the mechanism behind the correlation of higher coverage and more upward bias cannot be deduced from this regression, the results are a first indication that competition may not remedy informational distortion among analysts.
The small trader reaction to these recommendations is consistent with competition failing to influence affiliated analysts towards more accurate recommendations is t. by the state of New York. Taking these two dates as cutoff points and rerunning the regressions of abnormal trade balances, we find that small investors start reacting more strongly to analysts of "independent" brokerages after analyst affiliation became a high-profile issue. Table XI presents the results. The negative coefficient on the interaction of "never affiliated" and "buy" or "strong buy" is significantly positive for buy recommendations and approximately zero for strong buys.
This suggests that small investors started understanding the implications of incentive conflicts only after they saw evidence on the resulting distortions. After learning evidence such as Merrill's Henry Blodget privately referring to stocks as "crap" that he had publicly touted, they were well able to react appropriately and avoid affiliated analysts. Information about these incentive conflicts was available before August of 2001, but the mere knowledge of an incentive conflict appears to be insufficient to motivate small investors to adjust.
VI. Conclusion
Analysts face incentives to positively bias the information they provide to investors.
These incentives are reflected in the very low number of sell and strong sell recommendations issued by all analysts, in particular by affiliated analysts.
We find that small investors do not adjust for the incentives of an analyst who faces an underwriting affiliation. While large investors do not place buy pressure on a stock following an affiliated buy or strong buy recommendation, small investors do. Large investors react more weakly to positive affiliated recommendations than to unaffiliated recommendations, while small traders react almost exactly the same to both affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations.
Return results show that following affiliated recommendations consistently earns lower returns than following unaffiliated recommendations, over many possible time horizons, and with many portfolio strategies. Small traders make losses by naively following affiliated analyst recommendations. Finally, additional competition does not seem to solve the problem. Affiliated analysts issue even higher recommendations when they face more competition.
It is possible that small traders simply cannot identify underwriting affiliation, or that it is too costly for them to research an analyst's background. In this case, investors should react more cautiously to recommendations in general, but instead our abnormal trade imbalance results suggest that small traders react more strongly to the general recommendation than large traders.
Alternatively, small traders should focus on analysts from non-underwriting firms. Instead, small traders react less to these analysts.
Only after scandals highlighted the effects of affiliation incentives did small traders moderate their reaction to affiliated recommendations, and begin focusing on non-underwriting brokerages. And only at that time did affiliated analysts begin issuing sell and strong sell recommendations. General awareness of the incentives was not sufficient to modify behavior, but rather the investors needed to be confronted with evidence on the resulting distortions. Our findings also have implications for the policy debate about the appropriate regulations to be imposed on brokerage houses. Our results suggest that simply informing agents of potential conflicts of interest may not be enough to remedy their behavior. Instead, public and direct "warning" about the recommendations of certain types of analysts appears to be necessary.
We have planned additional tests, including alternate tests for return differences and for investor reactions to competition. Our results thus far indicate that analyst incentives affect their recommendations, with competition among analysts failing to mitigate the effect, and that small investors fail to account for these distortionary incentives. Overall, the traditional economic assumption of uninformed agents taking into account the incentives of informed agents, does not seem to hold for small investors in the market for information about stocks. and is used as a broker size control 2. Employees represents the total number of employees for the brokerage firm issuing the recommendation and is used as a broker size control 
